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 Behind the aid brand: Distinguishing between development finance 
and assistance 
James Copestake 
Abstract 
International aid is often analysed as if it was a homogeneous product exclusively distributed 
between a relatively small numbers of public agencies. In contrast, this paper contributes to 
thinking about aid as a quasi-market with many different suppliers, users, channels, products 
and brands. More specifically, it suggests drawing a stronger distinction between development 
finance and development assistance. A simple graph shows how this entails distinguishing 
between social impact and financial sustainability. Given that these characteristics are often far 
from transparent, the paper also illustrates the limitations of a rational choice approach to 
analysing aid. The difficulties entailed in assessing aid impact and sustainability help to explain 
why brand reputations matter. The argument is illustrated with references to UK aid, aid to 
Ethiopia, and NGO promotion of smallholder linkages into agricultural value chains in Africa. 
 
Key words: International aid; Brands; Development finance; Development assistance; Social 
impact; Financial sustainability; Smallholder agriculture; NGOs; Ethiopia 
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1 Introduction 
International aid was never simple, but it seems to become ever more complex as agencies, 
acronyms, and financing mechanisms proliferate. Practitioners as well as the public struggle to 
keep up.1 The global policy regime erected around the Millenium Development Goals can be 
viewed in part as a response to this: a grand bargain between leading official donors and state 
recipients to finance expenditure on primary health, and other polices aimed at reducing multi-
dimensional poverty. But behind this façade and the rhetoric of new global partnerships, the aid 
world remains highly fragmented. Aid can usefully be viewed as a planning and a collective 
action problem; and also as a multiple principal agent problem within bureaucratic hierarchies. 
But the starting point for this paper is to view it also as a quasi-market characterised by 
competition as well as collaboration.2  Is aid working? Rather than a grand or a bland yes or no, 
the more accurate answer is often that it all depends on the aid type and context. Further 
questions then abound, including what sort of aid works worst and best, when, where and why. 
Not everyone is receptive to such detail: our own problems naturally loom large over those of 
distant strangers, and it is often convenient and perhaps even necessary to deal with 
international aid in the round as a single public policy issue. But many people are interested, and 
would like to be better able to distinguish between different forms of aid than they can now 
(Horton, 2010).3  
As consumers we routinely choose between thousands of supermarket products – too many 
perhaps. Instead of the “57 varieties” first marketed by the Heinz Company in 1896, for example, 
there are currently around 5,700 (Heinz Foods UK, 2013). As the aid industry has similarly 
diversified, it is interesting to ask how the way it markets its products has also evolved. Of 
course, the analogy is problematic. If marketing exists to provide a service to sovereign 
consumers, then aid is complicated by ambiguity over whether consumers are those who fund it 
or those who are intended to benefit from it. 4 Aid support can also be viewed as more properly 
the outcome of political deliberation than active marketing of its providers. However, post-
modern marketing theory increasingly recognises ambiguity in the roles and relationships of 
consumers and producers, as well as the deep but problematic infusion of business and 
marketing perspectives into politics and democracy (Firat & Dholakia, 2006). Brands may remain 
primarily the intellectual property of corporations, who use them to strengthen their 
relationship with customers and to position themselves favourably relative to rival suppliers; but 
this does not stop them also becoming “shared cultural property” (Cova & Dalli, 2009, p. 317). 
                                                             
1 Recent surveys offer ambiguous findings, and highlight the sensitivity of responses to the way the question is framed (Glennie, 
Straw, & Wild, 2012; Henson & Lindstrom, 2011; Hudson & vanHeerde-Hudson, 2012). 
2 For incisive surveys of the changing international aid landscape, see Severino and Ray (2009) and Kharas and Rogerson (2012). 
3 A large “tribe” of aid “consumers” is of course highly informed about aid, and indeed, often actively engaged in its “co-production.” 
But this does not belie the need for wider public understanding and support to sustain wider public funding. See Cova and Dalli 
(2009) for relevant post-modern marketing theory. 
4 Within the institutional economics literature, this ambiguity is also referred to as a “broken feedback loop” (Martens, Mummert, 
Murrell, & Seabright, 2002), and the aid branding problem can be viewed as part of the institutional response to information 
asymmetries between principals and agents along the aid chain. 
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Travelling through rural Ethiopia not long ago, I passed the time by taking pictures of the 
international aid signs we passed along the road: a European Union funded agriculture project, a 
South Korean aided model village, an Indo-Ethiopian sugar mill, a USAID sponsored dairy and so 
on. Such advertising may be viewed both as a modest step towards greater aid transparency, 
and as more than just symbolic of the way external aid undermines country ownership of its own 
development - even if some of the signs did at least also display the Ethiopian flag. In her 
celebrated book No Logo Klein (2000) railed against branding as another example of the rise of 
corporate power and the privatization of public space. But branding can also help to overcome 
information overload, improve the match between product quality and expectations and enable 
the public to differentiate more clearly between products. Brands also place corporate 
reputations on the line and are open to being subverted. Much depends on the availability, 
quality and influence of independent evidence to inform consumers’ judgements about which 
brands they like and why. 
Consider the case of official aid from the UK. For many years its branding was low key, with no 
reference in its name to its British origin, for example. In 2009, this changed with the 
introduction of the brand UKaid, followed by the decision in 2012 to add the Union Jack to the 
logo along with a “from the British People” tag line that directly emulates USAID. These changes 
can be viewed as populist and nationalist, but they do also signify a wider search for ways to 
strengthen public identification with the official aid programme and its many products. The 
UKaid brand covers a huge range of activities, and can be compared with that of a supermarket: 
offering directly managed ‘own label’ products alongside a range of brands ‘supplied’ by other 
agencies. Take the case of its aid to African agriculture, for example. Direct UK aid for this 
through its own bilateral country programmes is tiny – no more than 1% of the aid budget in 
2009 (Development Initiatives, 2011). Meanwhile, more than twice as much is channelled 
through multilateral agencies and funds, including AAC, AAF, AATF, ADF, AECF, AGRA, BACF, 
CDC, CGIAR, EAIF, EDF, FA, FAO, FRICH, FSDTs, FSI, GA, GPAF, HP, ICF, IDA, IFAD, IFC, MASP, NVA, 
PIDG, PPA, SAGCOT, SHA, UNDP and WFP.5 Some of these represent an agency and others a 
funding mechanism, but they are all aid brands of a sort, and I have not included in the list the 
many private companies and consultancies working behinds the scenes. 
So what options are there to enable the public to see beyond the brand images promoted by aid 
suppliers? Martens (2002) provides a formal model to explain why public funding of aid 
evaluation to address the potential missing market for aid information is likely to be sub-
optimal. However, this pessimistic view is not wholly borne out by the evidence. First, 
substantial work is going into improving aid statistics to make it clearer who gives what, to 
                                                             
5 This list was compiled from three reports: Development Initiatives (2011),  DFID (2011) and War on Want (2012). In full they refer 
to the following: African Agricultural Capital, African Agricultural Capital, African Agriculture Fund, African Agricultural Technology 
Foundation, African Development Fund, Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund, Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, Beira Agricultural 
Growth Corridor, Commonwealth Development Corporation, Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research, Emerging 
Africa Infrastructure Fund, European Development Fund, Food and Agriculture Organisation, Farm Africa, Food Retail Industry 
Challenge Fund, Financial Sector Deepening Trusts, Food Security Initiative, Global Poverty Action Fund, Grow Africa, Harvest Plus, 
Investment Climate Facility, International Development Agency, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International 
Finance Corporation, Malawi Agro-dealer Strengthening programme, New Vision for Agriculture, Private Infrastructure Development 
Group, Programme Partnership Agreements, Southern Agricultural Corridor of Tanzania, Self Help Africa, UN Development 
Programme, World Food Program.  
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whom, and when.6 Second, and moving beyond statistics on flows, the UK is relatively well 
endowed with agencies mandated to comment on the quality of aid. Parliamentary oversight is 
important here, particularly the work of the International Development Select Committee, to 
which the Independent Commission for Aid Impact reports. More official resources are also 
going to independent bodies like 3ie, adding to the very substantial  aid accountability activities 
of media, lobby groups, think tanks, NGOs and universities. 
The argument developed in this paper is not that we need more, better or even different aid 
assessment capacity of this kind. Rather, I argue that there is a need for all these commentators 
to be clearer about how they talk about aid. For example, it would help if commentators (from 
theoreticians to the tabloid press) could be more scrupulous about when they are referring to 
particular agencies, as well as financing mechanisms. More fundamentally, I argue, we need a 
clearer and stronger terminology for distinguishing between different kinds of aid, while at the 
same time accommodating new development financing mechanisms, such as impact investing. 
To be more specific, I draw a distinction between development assistance and development 
finance, locating the difference in two dimensions by which aid can be assessed.7 I argue that 
this distinction is particularly useful in a world where the boundary between public and private 
mechanisms for mobilising and using aid are becoming more blurred.8 Section 2 uses a simple 
graphical model to explain these concepts more clearly. Section 3 then fleshes out the argument 
with illustrative examples, including the case study of an NGO project which promotes 
smallholder malt barley production in Ethiopia. Section 4 explores some of the wider 
implications of the argument and Section 5 concludes.  
2 A graphical model  
2.1 Aid chains  
This section uses a simple graphical model as a heuristic device to clarify the distinction between 
development assistance and development finance on the basis of the relative priority given to 
transferring resources to end users or investing in the financial sustainability of development 
partners.9 In so doing it also reveals how little we know about relative aid performance 
possibilities compared to how much it would be useful to know. To make this argument as 
clearly as possible, I base it on a stripped-down aid chain comprising just three stakeholders: a 
donor, a local partner, and a single undifferentiated group of end users. 
                                                             
6 This is one area where there has been some progress with the Paris process on aid effectiveness in moving beyond traditional 
reliance on statistics produced by the OECD Donor Assistance Committee (e.g. Development Initiatives, 2012; Tierney et al., 2011). 
7 An increasingly widely used distinction is between aid for (a) social welfare (b) mutually beneficial economic growth or 
convergence (c) global public goods (e.g. Kharas & Rogerson, 2012; Severino & Ray, 2009). The distinction drawn here echoes that 
between the first two, but is more precise. Aid for global public goods, including climate change mitigation and adaptation, is not 
included in the analysis. Doing so would entail adding a third assessment criterion and hence a third dimension to the basic diagram. 
8 One illustration of this is that by 2011/12 £489 million or 9% of DFID aid expenditure was routed through private sector contractors  
(Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2013). 
9 One instrument for doing the latter is to build capacity through training, technical assistance and policy advice. A limitation of the 
graphical framework presented here is that the outcome of capacity building is formally measured only through increased social 
impact or financial sustainability, with capacity building itself being implicitly viewed only as a means to these ends. 
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Figure 1 presents two versions of this simple aid chain. Arrows from left to right depict the flow 
of aid resources in both cases, but in Version A there is also a reverse arrow from end users back 
to the aid partner to indicate that they also make some payment for the money, goods or 
services received.10 This suggests potential for the partner to become at least partly financially 
independent from the donor over time. Such payments are also an important (if not sufficient) 
form of feedback to the partner that they are indeed providing end users with something they 
value. In the case of Version B, in contrast, the partner must persuade someone else (e.g. local 
taxpayers) to fund them if they are not to go out of business when the aid runs out.11 There are 
many ways in which Figure 1 could be embellished, and a more complex version is presented in 
Section 3.3. But before that I think it is useful to persist for a while with this simple model in 
order to elaborate on how we can assess these core aid relationships.  
 
Figure 1: Simplified aid chains 
 
2.2 Graphical presentation  
Figure 2 provides a graph that enables us to map any aid activity a donor might choose to 
finance in two dimensions, hence providing one way to classify different kinds of aid. The aid 
activities can be large or small, heavily conditional or open-ended, a single payment or a long-
term commitment (e.g. to set up a new partner). However, the analysis is best suited to the case 
of a donor choosing between discrete activities or sets of activities with separable impacts.  For 
                                                             
10 Some of the money recovered could also be returned to the donor, but for simplicity I will assume here that it all stays with the 
partner. Donor can transfer funds to end users to use to purchase services from partners. For a fuller discussion of different models, 
see Wongtschowski et al. (2013). 
11 A third exit strategy is for end users to disengage completely from the partner. In the graphical analysis below this is subsumed 
under social impact. 
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this reason they are referred to in this section simply as projects, with each referring to a 
commitment to spend money on a designated activity over a fixed time period.12 
Figure 2: A graphical aid typology 
 
The X axis represents the effect of the project on the financial sustainability of the partner 
agency. Measuring this is largely an accounting task, though it is the incremental rate of return 
on project funds that we are interested in, rather than the overall business performance of the 
partner.13 I have drawn a line called the ‘commercial frontier’ to show where money recovered 
from end users as a result of the project matches what could be earned instead by using the aid 
money instead to make a theoretical risk free investment for the same period, earning a small 
premium and preserving the capital 100% intact. Note that if a project actually increases 
donor/partner obligations then it is possible for the effect of a project on financial sustainability 
to be negative – a possibility that can be linked both to the “recurrent cost problem” (Howell, 
1985) and to the metaphor of aid dependency as an addiction.14 Aid recovery may also happen 
                                                             
12 More narrowly defined, project aid was criticised for downplaying macroeconomic influences on aid effectiveness, adding to aid 
monitoring costs and ignoring the fungibility problem. The latter refers to the possibility that the intended project activity would 
have been undertaken anyway, hence weakening the link between aid and the supposedly earmarked activity. These arguments 
suggest that the analysis presented here may work best for donors who are not in a position to influence macro-context, but fund 
activities (a) sufficiently large that they can absorb reasonable monitoring costs, (b) but are unlikely to have been undertaken 
without donor influence and support.  
13 The basic arithmetic for measuring this is standard to project appraisal – see, for example, Price Gittinger (1982). There is also an 
extensive literature on how to measure this for the special case of a project where the donor aims to support the partner agency to 
the point of being financially self-sustainable or subsidy independent (e.g. Armendariz & Morduch, 2010).  
14 At the same time, fostering a political imperative to meet new demands from poor end users can be seen as a positive benefit, 
particularly in unequal societies where lack of voice and power to demand more public services can be seen as a constraint to more 
equitable development. 
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over time, and so strictly we should refer to the net present value of the aid recovered. It might 
also be appropriate to make some allowance for the risk attached to the prospective return. 
I have labelled the Y axis social impact. For the purpose of this argument it is easiest to think of it 
as the benefits to end users arising from the project expressed as a percentage of the project 
cost to the donor. A benchmark reference here is that if it were possible to give the entire 
budget directly to end users without incurring any administrative costs then the social impact 
would be 100%. Other projects can then be compared against this: a social impact of more than 
100% can be achieved if the partner succeeds in turning donor money into something even more 
valuable to end users than cash (life changing improvements in education, for example); but the 
social impact is also reduced by the partner’s administrative costs. Incremental benefits to any 
project may accrue over time, so strictly we should again be referring to the net present value of 
the project’s social impact, and adjusting it for risk. In addition the value attached by the donor 
to transfers may vary according to the relative poverty status of particular end users, or other 
factors affecting the value placed on benefits to this group.  
What the graph illustrates is some of the factors likely to affect a donor’s project selection at 
one moment in time. Ideally, the donor will want to aid projects expected to perform well on 
both counts - i.e. at the top right of the graph. But in practice it faces a trade-off determined by 
the range of aid technology available at any moment in time. This is shown on the graph as a 
performance possibility frontier (PPF) above which it is by definition impossible to operate. 
However, it is possible to operate below it, and this may not be inefficient for two reasons: first 
because aid projects are not perfect substitutes for each other, and it may not be possible to 
allocate all money to the cutting edge projects on the PPF; second because outcomes are 
uncertain, so a mixed portfolio of aid may be safer.15  
Within the constraints in aid technology represented by the PPF at any moment in time we can 
distinguish between two extreme types of aid.  
Development finance (lower right, marked by circle A) allows the partner to recover more 
money, indeed it may be profitable, but with less benefit to end users. Microfinance is an 
example of this. Development assistance (top left, marked by circle B) does relatively well on 
social impact, but less well on financial sustainability: in other words aid has to keep flowing 
from the donor to sustain the benefits to end users. Conditional cash transfers are an example of 
this. There are also an interesting range of intermediate possibilities (marked by circle C).16 
The reason for introducing this graph is to explore more precisely the aid options facing a donor. 
But how far is it possible to make the informed choices it illustrates? The aid industry is generally 
heavily preoccupied with accounting for how money moves from donors to partners to end 
                                                             
15 To elaborate, investment in any one type of project is likely to be subject to diminishing marginal performance in both 
dimensions. Projects may also be differentiable on additional criteria not shown here (e.g. commercial and/or geo-political benefit to 
the donor). The analysis also assumes that the donor does face a range of separable investment options: i.e. that expected impact 
and sustainability of projects are exogenous to choice of other projects at the same time. Of course, choice in one period will affect 
those in later period (due to learning by doing, for example) requiring the PPF to be updated constantly over time.  
16 This is defining development finance more precisely and narrowly than is currently general practice. For example, use of the term 
can be extended beyond aid to include commercial finance (e.g. foreign investment) or public finance (e.g. raised through taxes or on 
capital markets) that is also contributing towards economic development.  
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users. And this is of course important. But on its own it falls a long way short of assessing social 
impact and financial sustainability.17 In practice, most donors operate with often quite sketchy 
knowledge of the performance possibilities of its many potential projects and partners. Hence 
perhaps the most important thing this graph does is remind us how little we generally know 
relative to what it would be useful to know.  While it can be used to clarify important 
distinctions underpinning different kinds of aid I am not suggesting that it provides a viable 
foundation for full-blown social cost-benefit analysis consistent with rational choice 
assumptions. Rather, I am using it to reinforce the argument that these choices are so complex 
that they inevitably have to be based on bounded rationality, open to intuition, prior mental 
models and the influence of branding. 
2.3 The case of development finance 
Figure 3 highlights two possible projects that a donor might be able to choose. A1 depicts the 
dream option for philanthropically minded capitalists that combines a strong business case with 
positive social impact. In contrast, A2 reminds us that overzealous or unscrupulous pursuit of 
financial sustainability can also lead to doing end users harm: aid in support of business models 
that entrap contract farmers, or aid for self-serving loan-sharks dressed up as microcredit 
institutions, perhaps.18  
 
Figure 3: Two development finance options 
 
                                                             
17 To put the point more pithily, a project with high impact but a lower financial audit rating might be preferred to one with squeaky 
clean accounting but low impact: unless of course potential reputational damage from any evidence of poor book-keeping weighs 
more heavily than more easily rebutted reputational damage arising from selecting potentially less effective projects. 
18 Swidler and Watkins (2009) also provide a salutary account from Malawi of the unintended social consequences of the overly 
exuberant pursuit of institutional sustainability within social development projects.   
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Section 3 considers different forms of development finance in more detail. Here I raise general 
issues relevant to them both, starting with input additionality. If an aid project is above the 
commercial frontier then it is important to ask why it needs to be subsidised at all – the danger 
being that aid money will undercut and crowd-out globally far more abundant private funding. 
High levels of risk and uncertainty are often sufficient to explain why private finance stays away 
from potentially profitable and high social impact projects. However, it is hard to prove this, 
particularly at a time when market supporting policies and infrastructure are widely improving, 
and private capital has become hungrier in seeking out higher rates of return than it can secure 
in more mature economies. Such counterfactual problems also arise in assessing social impact. 
Fund managers are usually able to quote impressive figures for new jobs created, for example, 
but can rarely demonstrate that the jobs wouldn’t have been created anyway. 
Where risk and uncertainty to commercial investment is aggravated by government policies 
towards business then an alternative use of aid money is to engage directly in policy reforms: to 
provide fairer access to markets by regulating monopolistic, discriminatory and exploitative 
practices, for example. This raises the contentious issue of how far donors can legitimately go in 
seeking to influence public policy in independent sovereign states – e.g. by presenting such work 
as pro-poor or helping local elites to overcome collective action problems (Booth, 2012, 2013).19 
A more radical critique of development finance is that it reflects a naively positive view of the 
potential role of the private sector and competitive markets in promoting development, as well 
as the insidiously accumulating influence of neo-liberal values and ideology.20 War on Want 
(2012), for example, suggest growing subservience of British aid to the interests of capital. DFID 
would I’m sure reply that engagement with private businesses is generally an effective means to 
the end of sustainable poverty reduction.21 This takes us back to the issue of the quality and 
accessibility of evidence on aid performance. 
2.4 Development assistance 
Switching to the other extreme type of aid, Figure 4 highlights two possible projects that a donor 
might be able to choose. B1 represents a cash transfer project that moves money as cheaply as 
possible (though not without some administration costs) to end users, while B2 represents in-
kind assistance, such as improved education, that achieves a social impact of more than 100%. 
As B1 lies below the PPF, the decision to finance it suggests limitations to the scope for routing 
money through projects closer to B2, or the possibility of complementarities between them. For 
example, the justification of cash transfers conditional on school attendance might depend on 
the success of parallel projects to improve the quality of education on the supply side. The 
                                                             
19 See, for example, the discussion of donor policy engagement to promote financial inclusion by Johnson and Williams (2013).   
20 Wiegratz (2012; 2010) provides an illustrative analysis of the dark side of neo-liberal culture in Uganda, including distrust, 
dishonesty and the rise of fraudulent practices. 
21 For example, the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2013) provided an overall green-amber assessment of five case studies 
of contracts, but also identified weaknesses in delivery and learning. 
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location of B2 along the PPF also indicates some possibility of budget recovery, whether directly 
through charging user fees, or indirectly by inducing increased tax receipts.22  
 
Figure 4: Two development assistance options 
 
Using aid to finance cash transfers of type B1 raises complicated operational issues and trade-
offs. For example, targeting transfers increases costs, but leakages to non-poor recipients 
resulting from universal provision may also be regarded as a cost. Recurrent transfers can also 
be expected to have complex behavioural effects on work, coping strategies, long-term fertility 
rates and so on. Perhaps the most important question is how large such transfers should be, and 
hence at what opportunity cost in terms of other aid and public spending options, including both 
development finance, as already discussed, and in-kind development assistance (B2), including 
road improvement, health and education services.  
2.5 Intermediate options 
Between the extremes of development finance and development assistance there are 
interesting intermediate options. These are illustrated by two possible points in Figure 5. P 
represents the overall average performance possibility of an agency that develops a mixed 
portfolio comprising discrete development assistance and development finance projects. In 
contrast, C represents support for a project partner or activity aiming for substantial but not full 
financial sustainability. Examples include subsidised credit, grants, in-kind technical assistance 
and equity for social enterprises, non-profit microfinance, social housing, state enterprises and 
cooperatives (including providers of subsidised farm inputs and food), and NGOs incorporating 
fair trade or other income generating activities. The graph has been drawn to pose an empirical 
                                                             
22 There is also the possibility that the PPF may initially be upward sloping because user charges enhance social impact by reinforcing 
a sense of end user entitlement and commitment.   
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question: do any intermediate forms of aid (C) outperform (in the sense of expanding 
performance possibilities) the best portfolio combinations of A and B (P)? In other words, how 
much does the PPF bulge outwards? 
 
Figure 5: Two intermediate aid options 
 
The first issue raised by such intermediate regimes is how to justify recurrent subsidy. One 
explanation is that social impact – including job creation - can be enhanced by tying transfers to 
partly financially self-sustaining activities. A more important justification comes from sustained 
spill-over benefits to third parties, who are neither partners not belong to the specified group of 
end users. For example, donors justified temporary subsidies to pioneering microfinance 
institutions on the basis of the infant industry argument that their on-going innovations were a 
non-excludable good that promised wider social benefits through being copied and adapted by 
others.23 
Intermediate aid confronts difficult management issues. For donors there is the soft budget 
problem of how to determine an appropriate level of subsidy, when performance is likely to be 
affected by the extent of such subsidy. For their partners there is the challenge of how to juggle 
two goals at once, one option being to set a simple minimum threshold for one (e.g. break even 
financially) in order to concentrate on maximising the other. They also have to establish and 
maintain comparative advantage in competition with commercial firms on one flank, and fully 
grant funded (and politically often better connected) public agencies on the other. One claim 
made by third sector organisations who occupy this territory is that they are a seed-bed for 
innovation. For example, microfinance developed in part through transformation of NGOs into 
                                                             
23 Such spill-overs may also include global public goods, including reduction of greenhouse gases. A fuller ‘triple bottom line’ analysis 
would incorporate these as a third axis of the diagram. 
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commercial financial organisations under the threat of loss of aid funding. Scaling up and 
mainstreaming of other intermediate aid partnerships may also entail a deliberate shift towards 
development assistance or state sub-contracting. But both commercialisation and state co-
option can also be the outcome of a more evolutionary “mission drift” towards these poles, 
driven more by messy political struggle that deliberate strategy (Copestake, 2007).  
3 Development finance for smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia 
Although the issue of branding discussed in Section 1, and the model presented in Section 2 may 
be relevant to aid quite widely, they were both drafted with the case of NGO aid for smallholder 
agricultural development in Ethiopia in mind. This section illustrates and expands on the 
argument within this narrower orbit.  
3.1 Why smallholder agriculture and Ethiopia? 
Prior to the global food price spike in 2007 donors were relatively complacent about national 
food security issues across much of Africa, principally because the cost of importing grain from 
other parts of the world was historically low. One consequence of this is that rapidly growing 
urban demand for food across the Continent has primarily been met through imports from 
outside: from 1990 to 2010 the cost of net food staple imports into Sub-Saharan Africa rose 
more than six times to around $US6 billion (World Bank, 2012a). This alarming increase in 
Africa’s reliance on food imports is not only financially burdensome and risky, it also represents 
a failure to realise the potential to produce and trade far more food internally, and in so doing to 
create employment for a still fast growing rural population (Jayne, Mather, & Mghenyi, 2010). 
This is fully compatible with a large long-term reduction in the number of people living in rural 
areas and relying on agriculture (gebreselassie, 2011a). However, the speed, depth and poverty 
dynamics of this transition remains uncertain, including how this will be influenced by climate 
change, and variation in farmers’ access to seeds and other inputs, technical knowledge, 
financial services and produce markets (Douglass Cecil North, 2005; Wiggins, 2012). 
Within this wider context there are two main reasons why I have chosen to focus particularly on 
Ethiopia. The first is that since the 1984 famine - and as a result of initiatives such as Band Aid, 
Comic Relief and Live Aid – public understanding of aid and of Ethiopia has become powerfully 
connected. Gill (2012, p. xi) warns of “… the damaging and one-dimensional image the Western 
world has of Ethiopia… an image created and sustained by the media and by aid agencies… 
unchanged in a quarter of a century.” The enduring association between famine and Ethiopia 
illustrates the power and persistence of a different and less deliberative kind of aid branding or 
labelling - and one that many Ethiopians are naturally very keen to change.  
One way to do so is development assistance of type B1 on Figure 4. The annual budget required 
to eliminate poverty depends critically on the miserliness of the definition adopted for poverty. 
The $US 220 official poverty line for Ethiopia, for example, is based on minimum food 
consumption requirements to avoid hunger. In 2011 approximately 25 million Ethiopians fell 
below this line, and on average, by 25%. From these statistics it is simple arithmetic to calculate 
that only $US1.5 billion would be needed each year to eliminate extreme poverty in Ethiopia. 
This would require each non-poor Ethiopian to pay a special tax of $US24 per year, or 5% of their 
average income.  This is to a large extent what the jointly government and donor funded 
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Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia sets out to do. Alongside sister emergency 
relief programmes it reaches more than 10 million people each year, and goes some way to 
explaining why famine in Ethiopia has not hit the headlines since 1984, as well as why the 
incidence (if not absolute numbers) of extreme poverty has fallen in Ethiopia during the last 
decade. 
A second reason for focusing on Ethiopia is that like Bangladesh in an earlier period it has 
emerged as something of a test case for the capacity of a country to utilise a surge or “big push” 
in aid funding to achieve greater national financial sustainability, as advocated particularly 
forcefully by Jeffrey Sachs and echoed in the “Make Poverty History” campaign (Sachs, 2005). 
Ethiopia is the world’s third largest aid recipient after Iraq and Afghanistan. Its other sources of 
external finance are growing, including foreign direct investment (around $US 1.2 billion per 
year) and family remittances ($US 225 million). But these are still much smaller than current 
official aid receipts of around $US 3.5 billion a year, amounting to more than 10% of national 
income (World Bank, 2012b). Yet there are some grounds for optimism. The World Bank also 
notes that Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, having officially 
sustained economic growth of around 10% per year for nearly a decade, though these figures 
have been contested (Economist, 2013, p. 11) . During this period extreme poverty in the 
country has fallen from 36% to 30% of the population and famine has been avoided. On the 
other hand, the scope for successfully rebranding Ethiopia as a graduate from aid, an emerging 
economy, important regional power and exciting tourist destination remains limited given that 
44% of children are still stunted, life expectancy at birth is still below 60 and population growth 
means that the absolute number of extremely poor people has hardly fallen from around 25 
million (World Bank, 2012b).24  
In Ethiopia these issues need to be viewed in the context of the state-orchestrated model of 
economic modernisation through market liberalisation, adapted by the late President Meles 
Zenawi and his party, from the experiences of South Korea and China (Fourie, 2013; Lavers, 
2012b). But agriculture continues to makes up half its gross domestic product, it remains the 
main source of income for 85% of the population and accounts for 85% of export earnings.25  
Hence the classic agrarian question lives on: how to manage the economics and politics of 
modernising agriculture without undue income polarisation and political instability. The key 
policy issue here is state land ownership: relax it and economic growth will accelerate, but with 
increased income disparities and migration too; tighten it and social change will slow down, but 
agricultural growth as well (Gebreselassie, 2011b; Lavers, 2012b).  
                                                             
24 Using a more generous $2 per day poverty line Kharas and Rogerson (2012) forecast that in 2050 Ethiopia will still have 30 million 
poor people: the fourth highest poverty incidence in the World behind Congo, Nigeria and Tanzania.   
25 Ethiopia is a signatory to the Maputo Declaration and the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) of 
the African Union, including the commitment to invest at least 10% of total government spending to agriculture with the goal of 
attaining food security. Its agricultural policy and investment plan for 2010 to 2020 projects total government spending over the 
decade of $US15.5 billion, with 40% is required from external donors, even when factoring in a 10% per cent annual GDP growth rate 
throughout the decade (Government of Ethiopia, 2010). 
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3.2 Alternative aid delivery mechanisms 
Development finance for African agriculture has been going on for many years: CDC being a 
leading example.26 But interest in such investment among donors, NGOs, multinational 
companies and social impact investors has surged, with particular interest in public private 
partnerships (PPPs) to promote smallholder inclusion in both domestically and externally 
oriented agri-business value chains (Poulton & Macartney, 2012).  In the UK, for example, it has 
prompted a parliamentary investigation (ASFG, 2012), an Economist Intelligence Unit briefing 
(EIU, 2013), two seminar at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 2013; Wiggins & Keats, 
2013), an Oxfam discussion paper (Sahan & Mikhail, 2012), an IIED research report (Vorley, 
Cotula, & Chan, 2012), and a critical paper from War on Want (2012).27  
Collier (2013) reviews the general case for this kind of “pioneering investment” in “small isolated 
economies” such as Ethiopia. In brief, he accepts that PPPs can encourage first-mover 
investment in empty and untested local market niches, helping the economy to break out of a 
poverty trap arising from gaps in the range of goods and services that are locally available and 
affordable. This deficiency (the opposite of more familiar agglomeration effects in industrial 
clusters) arises from a combination of the high costs of importing globally mass produced goods, 
limited scope to realise within-country economies of scale, and uncertainty over government 
policy and governance. In Ethiopia an interesting “arm’s length” broker (Booth, 2013) of 
development finance to unlock this trap for the agricultural sector is the Agricultural 
Transformation Agency, itself set up with support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
One mechanism for directing aid towards pioneering investment is the challenge fund. In brief, 
this starts with a donor issuing a public invitation for potential partners to ‘pitch’ for money to 
subsidise an investment they regard as too risky or marginal to justify financing commercially, 
but with potential for positive social impact. While precise in intent, the donor leaves scope for 
bidders to elaborate on how to achieve specified goals. An example that has been operating 
since 2009 is the Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund” (FRICH). This provides matching funds for 
projects implemented by British companies to strengthen their links with African smallholders.28 
Even larger is the Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF), managed by the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa and funded by a consortium of donors including DFID. Challenge funds are 
also an important mechanism for funding agricultural research (and indeed research more 
generally), as well as for supporting Southern NGOs and promoting civil society.29 
                                                             
26 CDC originally stood for the Commonwealth Development Corporation and is the UK’s leading development finance institution. 
27 Alongside and in tension with this issue is the even more controversial question of public and private investment in large-scale 
commercial agriculture. While this could certainly be classified as a form of development finance it is more peripheral to aid debate 
and so not discuss further here. See Lavers (2012a) for a discussion of the issue in Ethiopia, and Collier and Venables (2012) for a 
more general discussion of the role of the state in broking such investment. 
28 According to the website in the fourth round of FRICHthe fund, worth £7.4 million, 15 out of 40 bids were successful. Eligibility 
criteria were: involvement of a retailer or retail brand with an established share of the UK or European market; capacity to contribute 
at least half the cost; funding to test piloting of an innovative concept or business model; potential for commercial sustainability; 
potential to improve the livelihoods of poor African farmers, farm workers and/or small scale entrepreneurs on a sustainable basis. 
29 An example of this is the Civil Society Support Programme in Ethiopia. This is jointly funded by Danish, Irish, Dutch, Norwegian and 
UK governments, and managed in Addis Ababa by a consortium led by the British Council 
Bath Papers in International Development and Well-Being 
Paper Number 24 
14 | P a g e  
 
Growing for-profit involvement in smallholder agriculture and the rise of more 
commercialisation development financing mechanisms pose an important challenge to 
international NGOs working in the same field. These are illustrated by the case study presented 
in the next section.30  
3.3 Case study: Self Help Africa’s malt barley project 
Barley is Ethiopia’s third most important crop by area and has been grown in the highlands for 
generations, for sale and as a staple, including for brewing traditional beer or tella. In the last 
five years market demand has also been boosted by a doubling in national consumption of 
industrially produced beer. This has attracted substantial foreign investment – including from 
French, Dutch, British and Chinese companies.31 But domestic production of malt barley has 
failed to keep up, and in 2011/12 nearly half of the 67.5 thousand tonnes required by the 
brewery industry in Ethiopia was imported.  
The Didda Plateau east of the Rift Valley in Oromia is a longstanding barley growing area and the 
location of Ethiopia’s only, and still government owned, malt barley factory. In 2012, a UK/Irish 
NGO Self Help Africa signed an agreement with the regional government for a three year project 
with a budget of approximately £300,000 to promote malt barley production and marketing in 
three districts across the plateau. Funding for the project came from Irish Aid and DFID under 
partnership agreements with SHA. SHA’s immediate partners on the ground are two cooperative 
unions and nine affiliated primary cooperatives, and the project aims to benefit 6,000 of their 
members.32 Figure 5 inserts the simplified aid chain (comprising donor, partner and end users) 
into a somewhat more detailed picture of the malt barley value chain.  
Farmer cooperatives are a long established means to realise economies of scale in input and 
output marketing for small-scale farmers, and cooperative principles include democratic 
accountability to members. However, there is a long-tradition of this being abused by top-down 
government control and Ethiopia is no exception. The cooperative ‘brand’ was badly tainted by 
the heavy-handed way the military regime or Derg used coops to organise farmers between 
1974 and 1987 (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003). But coops have nevertheless retained a substantial 
presence in the countryside: officially there are more than 10,000 (including rural savings and 
credit coops) with five million members. Hence working with them as partners can be seen to 
                                                             
30 Of course, NGOs are themselves highly heterogeneous. One response of the largest has been to consolidate: Oxfam recently 
merged five previously distinct country programmes in Ethiopia, while Save the Children carried out the same task for seven, for 
example. Other NGOs have sought scale in their advocacy work through collaboration, including the thirteen members of the African 
Smallholder Farmers Group (see http://www.asfg.org.uk/).  
31 The market leader BGI Ethiopia is owned by French drinks company Group Castel, but they have been challenged during the last 
few years by Heineken who purchased two breweries from the Government in 2011 (Bedele and Harar, for $85million and $78 million 
respectively) and recently announced $156 investment plans to construct a third plant near Addis Ababa. UK drinks giant Diageo also 
entered the market in 2012 with a $225 million purchase of Meta Abo Brewery, while the local Habesha brewery is constructing a 
new plant with support from the Lehui Group,  China’s leading beer manufacturer. 
32 Self Help Africa was formed in 2008 through a merger of two smaller NGOs, both responses to the Ethiopian famine of 1984 that 
sought to demonstrate the potential of Africa to be more self-sufficient in food. It has an annual budget of around £8 million and 
operates across nine countries. It has particular expertise in seed sector development (e.g. see Self Help Africa, 2012). A few years 
ago I joined its programme advisory committee, and this has prompted me to revisit the issues covered in this paper, not least 
through three visits to Ethiopia including two to the malt barley project. 
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some extent at least as “going with the grain” of local institutions (Booth, 2012). The historical 
tendency for state subsidies and political meddling to undermine the business orientation of 
cooperatives is possibly also weakening somewhat as a result of the Government’s shift to a 
more market oriented development strategy and ideology (Government of Ethiopia, 2012). 
Turning to consider end users, although land in Ethiopia is ultimately owned by the state, most 
farmers participating in the project have secure rights over between one and two hectares, 
although sharecropping is also common and hence farm size distribution is more unequal than 
this might suggest (Kebede, 2008). Barley yields rarely exceed three tonnes or thirty quintals per 
hectare, and the average is far less than that. A baseline monitoring survey for the project 
suggests that few participants were living below the extreme poverty line, but owned relatively 
few assets, and remain vulnerable to rainfall and other shocks. Coop members are more likely to 
be better off and the vast majority are men (e.g. 88% for Galema Union). Hence spill-over effects 
(positive and negative) from direct project participants to other family members and to 
neighbours are important. Figure 6 illustrates the critical importance of government: as supplier 
of the pre-basic improved seed on which the project relies for multiplication; as regulator of the 
cooperatives and the seed sector; and also as a collector of tax revenue. A key issue here is how 
tax, trade and exchange rate policy influences the relative competitiveness of importers and 
local producers: this being one potential source of risk deterring private for-profit investment in 
local supply. 
 
Figure 6: The malt barley project 
 
The financial sustainability of the project is monitored through the activities and accounts of 
participating cooperatives. For social impact the project log frame sets out a clear theory of 
change. In short, this develops the case for believing that improved seed supply (through 
supervised farm based multiplication) combined with technical advice and better marketing 
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services delivered through the cooperatives can raise malt barley yields of participating 
members by 85% in three years. Indicators of performance relative to this plan are being 
monitored through farmers’ uptake of the services, reported crop yields and a repeat sample 
survey of changing household income. A baseline survey of sources of income of 61 households 
in one sub-district suggests that success in achieving the projected 85% increase in yields by the 
end of project would increase their annual disposable income over basic food needs by 39% (Self 
Help Africa, 2013). This would represent an increase in cash income of approximately £75 per 
household per year at January 2013 prices and exchange rates; and if replicated across the 
target of 6,000 households would amount to an aggregate annual benefit of more than 
£438,000 – greater than the total project budget.33 This project may not suit the tastes of all 
donors: for example, it is not targeted at the very poorest and at the macro level it promises to 
support beer production and to save foreign exchange rather than augmenting staple food 
supply (cf. Sahan & Mikhail, 2012). But it does illustrate the potential of projects in this context 
to achieve both high social impact and financial sustainability. 
4 Discussion 
4.1 NGOs and Ethiopia 
While in no way representative, the malt barley project case study does illustrate wider issues 
confronting development NGOs working in this area.34  For example it illustrates the importance 
of their technical and broking skills alongside their capacity to mobilising financial resources.  
While the Ethiopian government is extremely watchful of foreign funded NGO activity in the 
country it also has a very strong commitment to smallholder agricultural development and food 
security, which makes this a relatively safe field in which NGOs can work. Collaborating with 
cooperatives also confers helpful political legitimacy (IRIN News, 2012). At the same time, 
charity legislation includes a robust rule that 70% of foreign aid entering the country through 
NGOs should be passed on to end users. This is easily achieved for development assistance 
projects. But it is harder for development finance, where technical staff inputs and training 
activities feature more prominently, but are not classified as part of the 70% of budget required 
to be transferred directly to end users. Hence it puts pressure on NGOs to shift towards 
development assistance projects even if this runs counter to a mission and branding that 
emphasises financial self-sustainability.  
More generally, there is the question of the role of the third sector (including NGO and 
cooperative based collective action) on the wider canvas of Ethiopia’s agrarian transformation. 
Even if the long-term scale and sustainability of such intermediate options remains uncertain, 
such activity is likely to enable some farmers to maintain and enhance a market niche, as well as 
                                                             
33 Of course, this is a very rough estimate. In particular, it is based on the assumption the project achieves its goals, which requires 
continued goodwill from government (for example) in supplying necessary pre-basic seed. While there are good prospects for it to 
sustainably boost household incomes it is also located in a relatively high potential area, and its end users are far from being the 
poorest and most vulnerable farmers in Ethiopia.  
34 The NGOs Farm Africa and Technoserve have also worked in the Ethiopian malt barley sector (in partnership with Diageo), while a 
Dutch NGO is similarly working with Heineken. 
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providing the government with useful political room for manoeuvre. Hence, it is too simplistic to 
dismiss all such efforts as romantic populism or the product of nostalgia for happy peasants. 
4.2 Aid performance and development theory 
The issue of economic viability applies not only to smallholder farmers but also to NGOs as aid 
donors. What they lack in terms of capacity to realise economies of scale they have to make up 
for through flexibility and innovation. A practical lesson from the case study is that social impact 
monitoring is made easier when there is a clear and robust theory of change linked to a 
relatively small number of measurable key performance indicators. However, even where 
indicators can be shown to move in the anticipated direction, the challenge remains to 
demonstrate that this is attributable at least in part to the funded activity, rather than to 
possible confounding factors. For example, in the case of the malt barley project, farm income 
will of course be influenced by variation in rainfall, prices and trade shocks. Disentangling the 
effect of these variables from the influence of the project itself is methodologically challenging, 
and requires that monitoring covers not only project activities but also other factors affecting 
intended impacts.  
This issue links to wider debates about impact assessment, complexity and the politics of 
evidence (e.g. Bevan, 2010; Green, Roche, Eyben, Dercon, & Witty, 2013; Mowles, Stacey, & 
Griffin, 2008; Ramalingam, Jones, Reba, & Young, 2008) and to underlying tensions in thinking 
about development practice. For example, Chambers (2010) contrasts a “neo-Newtonian” 
preference for more mechanistic and quantitative approaches to aid performance assessment, 
to an “an adaptive pluralist” view in favour of more eclectic, qualitative and mixed approaches.  
Adaptive pluralists fear that a rampant neo-Newtonian aid audit culture (with a bias for planned, 
predictable and measurable outcomes) will restrict scope for messier but more innovative and 
radical action (e.g. Natsios, 2010).  Meanwhile, neo-Newtonians may suspect that aid 
practitioners are resistant to stricter performance discipline because it risks exposing their own 
performance limitations (e.g. Martens, Mummert, Murrell, & Seabright, 2002).  
Juxtaposition of these polar views provides a useful starting point for critically examining the 
scope for intermediate positions, and for analysing how the tensions between them play out in 
different contexts (Gulrajani, 2010, 2011). It also serves as a reminder that confronting the 
almost overwhelming complexity of development we are all forced to base our decisions on 
inevitably partial “mental models” of reality (North, 1990).  For example, Williamson (2009) 
provides a detailed case study of how quite subtle differences in the shared mental models of 
aid evaluation and participation within three official aid donors and among their Ethiopian 
counterparts affected their aid relationships. A view of development based on a complexity 
ontology also justifies the search for both “good enough” aid evaluation methods and for broad 
but useful conceptual distinctions such as the one between development assistance and 
development finance proposed in this paper.35  
                                                             
35 Improving qualitative social impact assessment is the central purpose of the “ART Project”: a collaborative action-research project 
led by the University of Bath into how to assess social impact in complex contexts of rural livelihood transformations in Malawi and 
Ethiopia (Copestake, 2013). 
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4.3 Aid branding 
This brief discussion of can be related back to the question of aid branding. Stronger branding of 
aid can be viewed as evidence of its increasing subordination to commercial and neo-liberal 
values. But more positively it can be seen as playing a role in helping the public (including end 
users) to identify and differentiate between aid providers within a more adaptive and plural aid 
system. One indicator of the force of these arguments is the extent to which aid brand 
marketing and perception is responsive to the flow of evidence on aid impact, rather than 
ideology, prior mental models and the ‘warm glow’ linked to the conscience-cleansing acts of 
giving. 
A prior condition for better evidence, I have argued, is being clearer about different types of aid. 
However, being more precise about meaning does not necessarily also entail fetishism about 
measurement. For example, the utility of the graphical analysis presented in this paper does not 
depend solely on how feasible it is in practice to estimate the performance possibility frontier. 
This is where branding comes in again. The process by which we assess the quality of a brand is 
complex and involves the synthesis of lots of evidence: including not just the brand owner’s 
advertising, but also third party commentaries and our own direct experience of the product. 
Likewise with aid: more and better evidence about variation in social impact and its 
sustainability would indeed be useful, but it would be madness to suggest that this necessarily 
entails measuring impact and sustainability of all aid activities as precisely as possible all the 
time. The social sciences offer a rich array of qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods to 
inform our view of different forms of aid and we should make use of the full range to inform our 
understanding of what lies behind aid brands. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper has linked the issue of aid branding to the deeper epistemological problem of how we 
know what forms of aid are working and why. Aid is complex and becoming more so, forcing us 
to make such judgements on the basis of imperfect mental models and limited evidence. I have 
suggested that the distinction between development finance and development assistance can 
help us to see through some of the complexity. For example, it can contribute to analysis of 
whether aid branding is associated with a trend towards greater commercialisation of aid, with 
more emphasis on ‘business-oriented’ development finance than ‘needs-based’ development 
assistance. Making such judgements entails assessing aid projects for both social impact and 
financial sustainability. In contrast, some donors may find it easier to market their aid to the 
public by conflating the two, and relying mainly on more emotive warm glow responses. I have 
suggested that while reliably assessing social impact is difficult, good enough impact evaluation 
does not necessarily require precise measurement, and can also help to inform the way aid 
brand reputations are established and maintained.  
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